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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, two former Google employees founded Airfox with a
mission to provide financial services to emerging markets.1 After
completing incubating rounds at TechStars Boston and Harvard’s
Innovation Lab, they developed their idea: users would earn
money by interacting with advertisements on their phones; then, if
those users opted to share their device data and browsing behavior,
they could build a credit history and apply for microloans.2 To
create a payment network that could cheaply and reliably handle
thousands of microtransactions between lenders, advertisers, and
users from across the globe, Airfox turned to one of the hottest new
technological trends: blockchain.
Specifically, Airfox wanted to create a digital asset (also called
a “token” or “coin”) using a blockchain. The token, which was
named AirToken, would essentially be the currency required to
participate in Airfox’s network.3 When users watched
advertisements, they would receive AirTokens from advertisers.
When users requested loans, they would receive AirTokens from
lenders. These AirTokens could be cashed out for fiat currency or
redeemed for cellular data and other goods from companies that
accepted AirTokens. Thanks to the decentralized nature of
blockchain, all these assorted parties would interact directly with
each other and not with Airfox itself.4
In 2017, Airfox held an initial coin offering (ICO) for its
application. In the ICO, investors gave money to Airfox in exchange
for promises to receive AirTokens once Airfox developed the
application.5 Airfox’s legal advisors felt confident that they would
avoid securities issues because they were distributing utility tokens,
which are redeemable for goods or services, instead of security

1. AirFox Raises $15 Million in Successful ICO, Brings New Mobile Banking Solutions to
Emerging Markets, BUSINESS WIRE (October 10, 2017), https://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20171010005598/en/AirFox-Raises-15-Million-Successful-ICO-Brings
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
2. AirToken (AIR): The Token for Mobile Access, AIRFOX (Aug. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Airfox White Paper] at 3–4, available at https://icosbull.com/eng/ico/
airtoken/whitepaper.
3. Id. at 3, 5–6 (describing the roles of users, carriers, advertisers, and publishers in
the network).
4. For a slightly more detailed introduction to blockchain, see infra, Part II.A.
5. For a slightly more detailed explanation of initial coin offerings, see infra Part II.B.
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tokens, which are representative of shares in a company’s profits.6
Within two months, Airfox raised $15 million from over 2,500
investors.7 At a time when the volatile ICO market was plagued
with scams and fraud, this accredited start-up was considered a
shining example of a successful ICO.8
The problem was that Airfox’s legal advisors were wrong. On
November 16, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
announced that AirTokens were securities and that Airfox had
violated securities laws by failing to register them.9 In its settlement
with the SEC, Airfox agreed to refund investors, pay a
$250,000 fine, register AirTokens as securities, and file all of the
SEC’s required disclosures for the rest of Airfox’s meaningful
existence.10 On that same day, the SEC sanctioned another
blockchain company that had also conducted an ICO, requiring
those exact same concessions.11
The SEC’s crackdown on ICOs was not a surprise. For a while,
the SEC had been suggesting that ICOs were most likely securities
offerings.12 However, in a small but important way, the
enforcement actions seemingly contradicted statements that SEC
officials had made just a few months earlier.
In April 2018, the Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, gave a
speech about regulating digital assets.13 Clayton compared utility
6. Ben Munster, Exclusive: Airfox CEO Says ICO Regulations Clearer After SEC
Settlement—But Not for Everybody, DECRYPT (Nov. 29, 2018), https://decryptmedia.com/
2018/11/29/exclusive-Airfox-ceo-says-ico-regulations-still-unclear-after-sec-settlement/.
7. AirFox Raises $15 Million in Successful ICO, Brings New Mobile Banking Solutions to
Emerging Markets, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20171010005598/en/Airfox-Raises-15-Million-Successful-ICO-Brings (last visited
Oct. 15, 2019).
8. Id.
9. CarrierEQ, Inc., d/b/a Airfox, Securities Act Release No. 10575, SEC (Nov. 16,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10575.pdf [hereinafter Airfox
Order].
10. Id. at 8–10.
11. Paragon Coin, Inc, Securities Act Release No. 10574, SEC (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf.
12. See SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, Release No. 81207, 11–15 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf; Munchee Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 10445, 8–9, SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2017/33-10445.pdf.
13. Nikhilesh De, SEC Chief Touts Benefits of Crypto Regulation, COINDESK (Apr. 5,
2018), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-not-icos-bad.
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tokens to laundromat coins. If someone buys several coins from a
laundromat that has yet to be developed, with the intent to sell the
coins at a higher price to others, then those coins are securities. But
if someone buys a coin simply to wash her clothes at the new
laundromat, then that coin is not a security. According to Clayton,
“[t]he use [of the laundry coin] can evolve toward or away from a
security.”14 When it comes to utility tokens, a security today is not
necessarily a security tomorrow.15
In June 2018, the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate
Finance, William Hinman, also spoke about regulating digital
assets.16 Hinman suggested that tokens could become so
decentralized over time that regulating them as securities may not
be required.17 He even opined that ether, the token of the popular
Ethereum network that is used to create self-executing contracts,
was too decentralized to be a security.18 This statement was
significant because ether, like AirTokens and hundreds of other
digital assets, had initially raised funds in an ICO.19
The SEC’s enforcement actions are somewhat inconsistent with
the earlier statements of its officials. Chairman Clayton and
Director Hinman had both suggested that a utility token, by its use
or by its lack of centralization, could potentially outgrow securities
regulations after its ICO. But in its November 2018 settlements, the
SEC required issuers of utility tokens to comply with securities
regulations for practically forever.20 This discrepancy asks the
question: Is it really ever possible for a digital asset to start out as a
security and eventually transform into a non-security? Looking at
recent judicial decisions, administrative guidance, blockchain

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), SEC
(June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/. The ether ICO was
called a “pre-sale”, but it functioned equivalently as an ICO.
20. The settlements require the companies to comply with disclosure requirements
until either (a) there are less than 300 users holding tokens or (b) there are less than 500 users
holding tokens and the company’s total assets have been less than $10 million for three years.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2016). See Airfox Order, supra note 9, at 9.
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functionality, and practices of blockchain developers, the answer is
complicated: theoretically yes, but practically no.
Much of the literature applying securities law to utility tokens
has focused on whether the initial distribution of the token makes
it a security. This Note, however, discusses whether securities
regulations can and should continue to apply to a blockchain
network’s digital assets even after its ICO has been deemed a
security offering. Part II further introduces blockchain technology
and ICOs. Part III discusses the SEC’s current regulations and how
they are incompatible with the functionality and purposes of
blockchain applications. Part IV outlines the two tests used to
determine whether something is a security: the Howey test and the
risk capital test. Part V reviews the SEC’s treatment of ICOs as
security offerings and why courts have agreed with the regulators.
Part VI presents two theories for how and when digital assets can
transform from securities into non-securities. The Part ultimately
pushes back on each theory by identifying practical aspects of
blockchain applications that are inconsistent with the theoretical
arguments. Part VII concludes this Note by suggesting that
proponents of utility tokens would profit more by focusing on how
to modify securities law to accommodate digital assets, instead of
trying to escape regulation under existing securities law.
I. A DIGITAL ASSETS PRIMER: BLOCKCHAINS AND ICOS
Applying securities law to utility tokens requires a general
understanding of how blockchain technology works and how ICOs
fit within the blockchain model. This Part provides a very basic
familiarity with these innovations.
A. Blockchain Technology
A blockchain is a comprehensive list of all the accounts in a
particular network and all the transactions to ever take place
between those accounts. It is constantly updated and publicly
visible to all users. Because each user shares a complete record of
all account balances and past transactions, there is no need for an
intermediary to verify that transactions are complete, or to prevent
users from fraudulently double-spending, or to transfer a payment
through other networks to the payee’s account. Users transact
directly with each other. The decentralized blockchain network
1117
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cuts out the middleman, allowing for lower transaction costs and
simpler global transactions.21
The users with positive balances in their accounts can use their
digital assets, sometimes called “tokens” or “coins,” to purchase
whatever goods and services that particular blockchain allows
sellers to offer, such as computer storage22 or restaurant dinners.23
Holders of those tokens may also receive certain rights, such as the
ability to upload content or access a certain website. Tokens with
these sorts of functionality are often referred to as “utility tokens”
or “consumptive tokens.” Other tokens represent a share of
ownership in a company, just like traditional stocks. These
“security tokens” often act like traditional stocks, giving holders a
right to vote on the decisions of the venture and to receive a share
of the venture’s profits.24 Tokens may have both consumer-like and
shareholder-like features.25
A functional blockchain is decentralized in the sense that
anyone selling goods and services or buying those goods and
services are exchanging exclusively and directly with each other, as
opposed to through a third party. But developers are not
completely hands-off once the network is functioning. The
developers might still make small changes, such as change the
application’s user interface, increase the minimum transaction size,
or fix small bugs. The developers might also make large changes,
such as modify how each transaction is verified, undo a permanent
transaction, or revert to a previous block of transactions on the

21. Vinay Gupta, The Promise of Blockchain is a World Without Middlemen, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-promise-of-blockchain-is-a-worldwithout-middlemen.
22. Filecoin is used on a network for buying and selling computer storage. See Protocol
Labs, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, FILECOIN (July 19, 2017),
https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf.
23. Munchee designed a token to be used as payment for restaurant reviews.
Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, SEC (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf.
24. See Rohit Kulkarni, Security Tokens Set to Take Center Stage in 2019, NASDAQ (June
22, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/security-tokens-set-to-take-center-stage-in2019-cm982207.
25. For an additional description of utility tokens and security tokens, see Nate
Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?,
67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 391–94 (2018).
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blockchain.26 To remain compatible and functional after these large
changes occur, all of the users must update to the most recent
version of the software and ensure that they are using the exact
same list of balances and transactions as everyone else.27
Apart from the developers, another group of people who make
the blockchain function are the transaction validators. Validators
spend their own resources to process all the network’s transactions
and permanently add them to the blockchain’s complete list of past
transactions. In return for their work, validators receive more of
that blockchain’s token. The validators are not always the same as
the developers; often, anyone can be a validator.
Each blockchain system has its own method of consensus, which
determines how the transactions are verified and which validator
is selected to do the work (and reap the reward).28 In proof-of-work
methods, validators compete against each other to solve a complex
math problem first: the winner adds the transactions and gets the
payment. In proof-of-stake methods, the validator is randomly
selected based on how much of the blockchain’s token it already
owns. This works because they would have to forfeit their tokens if
anything nefarious occurred during the verification. Other
blockchains are permissioned systems, which designate only certain
people or entities to do the validations. Developers are frequently
implementing hybrids or variations of the above methods or
devising new consensus mechanisms.29

26. See, e.g., Jake Frankenfield, Hard Fork (Blockchain), INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp; Rachel Rose O’Leary, Ethereum
Developers Move to Alter Blockchain’s Economics in Next Upgrade, COINDESK (Aug. 31,
2018, 3:53 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-developers-move-to-reduce-newcryptocurrency-creation (discussing upcoming changes in the Ethereum blockchain that
alters how much new ether gets distributed).
27. Catherine Tims, What Happens During a Cryptocurrency Hard Fork?, CRYPTOS R US
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://cryptosrus.com/what-happens-during-a-cryptocurrency-hard-fork/.
28. Ameer Rosic, Basic Primer: Blockchain Consensus Protocol, BLOCKGEEKS (2017),
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchain-consensus/. See also Peter Van Valkenburgh,
Framework for Securities Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, COIN CENTER (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://coincenter.org/entry/framework-for-securities-regulation-of-cryptocurrencies
(discussing proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and permissioned methods of consensus, as well
as hybrids of those types).
29. See Vaibhav Saini, ConsensusPedia: An Encyclopedia of 30+ Consensus Algorithms,
HACKERNOON (June 26, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/consensuspedia-an-encyclopediaof-29-consensus-algorithms-e9c4b4b7d08f (listing about thirty different consensus
algorithms, with pros and cons for each).
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B. Initial Coin Offerings
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) typically begin with a PDF.
Inventors with an idea for an interesting and valuable application
of blockchain technology write a paper detailing the idea, create a
website, and then publish their paper. They then request money, in
exchange for a promise of coins, tokens, or other digital assets.
Developers use those funds to program the application itself. After
a couple of years of development and working out the kinks in the
application, the blockchain will go live. Upon initialization, it will
contain positive balances for the investors who contributed money
during the ICO (and usually for the developers themselves) and
will begin recording transactions between the users.
There are a number of advantages to ICOs.30 First, they reach an
enormous number of potential investors. Anyone with an internet
connection can donate, regardless of economic status or geographic
location. This expansive reach suits the functionality of the
blockchain application, which is also accessible and usable by
anyone anywhere with internet access. Second, they require almost
zero capital to conduct. The ICO market is an ideal meritocracy,
requiring only a bright idea, an explanatory write-up (also known
as a white paper), and perhaps a website where the idea can be
further illustrated and advertised. With an ICO, it does not take
money to make money.
But the lack of barriers to entry creates a foreseeable problem:
some people enter the ICO market who should not have entered.
Perhaps they lack the ability to actually implement their ambitious
idea. Or maybe they are scammers and never intended to create a
functioning blockchain in the first place. These problems make it
possible that those donors, who could be anyone, anywhere with
internet access, may lose their money without ever seeing a
functional coin or token returned to them. Luckily for those
unfortunate investors, and (perhaps) unluckily for blockchain
application developers, there is a large organization whose sole
purpose is to prevent those kinds of busts: the Securities and
Exchanges Commission.
30. See, e.g., Matthew J. Higgins, Munchee Inc.: A Turning Point for the Cryptocurrency
Industry, 97 N.C. L. REV. 220, 220–21 (2018) (comparing ICOs to other ways of raising capital
such as IPOs, which are extremely expensive, and venture capital funding, which often
require ceding some ownership and control).
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II. SECURITIES REGULATIONS: REQUIREMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS
The mission of the Securities and Exchanges Commission is to
“[p]rotect investors, [m]aintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
[and] [f]acilitate capital formation.”31 When protecting investors,
however, it does not protect them from making bad investment
decisions. It merely protects them from making uninformed
investment decisions. The government is not in the business of
judging which companies will succeed and which will fail, but it
does force companies to disclose enough information so that
investors can make that judgment themselves.32
A familiarity with the SEC’s regulations makes it easier to
understand why developers of blockchain applications would
prefer to avoid the SEC’s jurisdiction, or at least not be subject to
the SEC’s jurisdiction forever.
A. Registration and Reporting Requirements
The SEC imposes reporting requirements on companies that
issue securities. Before issuing securities, a company must register
these securities with the SEC by filing a Form S-1.33 A Form S-1
requires a huge amount of information, such as the company’s
geographical location, how much money it is asking for, how much
money it has, who its officers are, how much its officers are paid,
what kind of investments it is asking for, and much more. The
company must also submit professionally audited financial
statements.34 Registration requirements must be completed before
the company can offer any securities.35
Even after registering the securities, the SEC requires
companies to continue filing reports. Once a year, the company
must file a Form 10-K, which contains much of the same

31. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/basics/role-sec (last visited Dec. 6, 2018).
32. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Recommendation for Federal Supervision of Investment
Securities in Interstate Commerce, U. OF MICH. DIGITAL LIBR. (Mar. 29, 1933),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4925381.1933.001/123.
33. Form S-1: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf.
34. What is a Registration Statement?, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/
goingpublic/registrationstatement (last modified Nov. 29, 2017).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
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information as the initial Form S-1.36 Additionally, the reporting
company must file a form 10-Q every quarter.37 These reporting
requirements last indefinitely, until the company has significantly
shrunk in terms of shareholders or value.38
In certain cases, the SEC allows companies to comply with a
reduced set of reporting requirements. For example, smaller
companies39 and emerging growth companies40 do not have to
include quite as much information in their initial registrations or in
their annual and quarterly reports. These companies do not have to
provide as many narrative disclosures or data about executive
compensation, and they only have to provide two years of financial
statements instead of three. They also have some leniency when it
comes to following certain accounting standards for their financial
statements. However, there is usually a cap on the maximum value
of a company that can qualify as a small business or an emerging
growth company.41
The regulations and requirements imposed by the SEC can be
crucially helpful for investors, but they can also cut against many
of the values of blockchain companies and the perceived benefits of
initial coin offerings. One of the unique benefits of an ICO is that it
requires very little money to get off the ground. Theoretically, it
only takes a genius idea clearly described in a PDF. But complying
with SEC requirements takes an immense amount of time and
resources.42 Reporting companies typically need to hire accountants
36. Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf. The Form 10-K’s
estimated average burden hours per response is 2395 hours.
37. Form 10-Q, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-q.pdf. The Form 10-Q’s
estimated average burden hours per response is 190 hours.
38. In general, a reporting company is only allowed to cease filing reports once a) it
has fewer than 300 shareholders or b) it has fewer than 500 shareholders and the company’s
assets have been worth less than ten million for three years. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2018).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f) (2018). See also, Smaller Reporting Companies, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/SRC (last modified July 24, 2019).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (2012). See also, Emerging Growth Companies, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC (last modified July 24, 2019).
41. A smaller reporting company maintains its status as long as it has a public value
of less than $250 million or annual revenues of less than $100 million. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f)(1).
An emerging growing company cannot exceed $700 million in public value or $1.07 billion
in annual revenues. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19).
42. The SEC estimates that the forms S-1, 10-K, and 10-Q take 671, 2395, and 190 hours
to complete, respectively. Form S-1, SEC, supra note 33; Form 10-K, SEC, supra note 36; Form
10-Q, SEC, supra note 37.
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and lawyers to prepare and audit the reports, which can get
extremely expensive. Start-up companies may have difficulty
finding the time or employees needed to round up all the
information that needs to be disclosed. Even the slightly reduced
requirements for small businesses and emerging growth
companies would be comparatively hefty for a blockchain
company considering an ICO.
B. Exemptions
Because Congress and the SEC understand how laborious
registration and reporting requirements can be, they have
provided some exemptions to the rules.43 These exemptions vary
in investment limitations, reporting requirements, and
holding restrictions.
The most common exemption is Regulation D, which exempts
companies who are raising less than $5 million or are issuing just a
small number of securities.44 The SEC allows these exempt
companies to file extremely lightweight reports at registration, and
they do not require ongoing reports.45 The caveat, however, is that
these companies either cannot advertise their offerings to the
general public,46 or must take measures to ensure that only
accredited investors are buying their securities.47 “Accredited
investors” are those that have a net worth of over $1 million or have
an annual income exceeding $200,000.48 Additionally, Regulation D
imposes holding requirements on the securities, meaning that those
who purchase them may not resell them for at least six month or a

43. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides numerous exemptions to the
registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012). Furthermore, it gives the SEC broad
discretionary power to create more exemptions. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012).
44. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–.506 (2018).
45. Id. See also, Form D: Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.
46. This is known as a “private placement” or a Rule 506(b) exemption., Private
Placements – Rule 506(b), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/
rule506b (last modified July 12, 2019).
47. This is a Rule 506(c) exemption. General Solicitation – Rule 506(c), SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rule506c (last modified July
12, 2019).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2018).
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year, depending on how much information the issuing company is
publicly disclosing.49
Regulation Crowdfunding is a newer exemption, created as
part of the JOBS Act in 2012.50 This regulation does not impose
restrictions on who can purchase the securities or to whom the
company can market its offering, but it prohibits raising more than
roughly $1 million in any given year and restricts the resale of
securities for one year.51
Regulation A is another exemption which was updated and
expanded with the JOBS Act.52 It allows companies to raise up to
$50 million and places no restrictions on the resale of securities.53
As a tradeoff, however, it requires more detailed disclosures,
including audited financial statements and ongoing reports.54
Blockchain developers would love to qualify for an exemption,
but even exemptions may not be practical for their needs.
Exemptions come with a strict limit on the amount of funds that can
be raised, and ICOs typically aim to raise well beyond that limit.
While the limits are helpful for a company that wants to start small
and grow larger, the unique decentralized goal of blockchain
developers is often the opposite: they want to start with a globally
functioning network and then play a smaller and smaller role as the
decentralized network takes off. Therefore, blockchain companies
often shoot for large initial investments of capital, which disqualify
them for the SEC’s exemptions.
Even if a blockchain company’s capital requirements are small
enough that it could qualify under an exemption, the exemptions
also include other restrictions that are intolerable for most projects,
especially ones that will use utility tokens. The tokens sold in
exchange for investment usually have some functions, such as
providing an ability to post content on a website or being
redeemable for certain services or goods. Developers want these
tokens to be accessible to anyone and freely tradable among users.
49. Id. § 230.144(d).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–
106, Title III, 126 Stat. 306, 315-323 (2012).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 227; see also SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding, https://www.sec.gov/
smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding (last modified July 12, 2019).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
53. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263.
54. Id.; see also SEC, Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/
exemptofferings/rega (last modified July 12, 2019).

1124

005.MAUGHAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1113

7/17/20 12:43 PM

Utility Token Offerings

Some of the exemptions, however, would restrict token sales to
only wealthy investors55 or prohibit token holders from exchanging
their tokens.56
Obviously, security regulations only apply to agreements that
are securities. If tokens created in ICOs were classified as nonsecurities, then they could be freely bought and exchanged
regardless of the onerous registration and reporting requirements.
That would be the ideal scenario for blockchain projects using
utility tokens, which are meant to be consumed and often look
starkly different from the stocks that are traditionally imagined
when one thinks of a security. The question is whether the law’s
definition of a security is broad enough to cover utility tokens on a
blockchain application.
III. DEFINING A SECURITY: THE HOWEY TEST AND OTHERS
The Securities Act of 1933 contains a very lengthy list of
instruments that count as securities.57 While most items on that list
are specific and more obvious, such as stocks and bonds, the list
also contains terms that are much more general, such as
“investment contracts.” These broader terms serve as a catch-all for
“[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices” that may act as
securities.58 Due to the novel nature of digital coins, courts and the
SEC have scrutinized whether digital coins are investment
contracts. There are two main tests for defining investment
contracts: the Howey test and the risk capital test.
A. The Howey Test
The seminal case interpreting what constitutes an investment
contract is SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.59 In Howey, the investors
purchased trees in an orange grove and then executed a service
contract with the seller’s company.60 The company would cultivate,
55. For example, Regulation D restricts sales to accredited investors. See supra text
accompanying notes 44–49.
56. Almost all exemptions restrict the resale of securities. SEC, Overview of
Exemptions, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/exemptofferingschart
(last modified Feb. 12, 2019).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
58. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
59. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
60. Id. at 295–96.
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harvest, and market the oranges on behalf of the purchasers, and
then the company would share the profits with the purchasers.61
The purchasers were predominantly business professionals who
had no interest in oranges, nor the skill necessary to cultivate the
oranges.62 Instead, they had been attracted by the promise of strong
annual returns.63
The Supreme Court determined that this arrangement was an
investment contract and thus a security.64 Even though it was
nominally just a real estate contract and a services agreement, the
Court ignored the names and types of instruments and focused on
the “economic reality” of the situation.65 Instead, the Court defined
an investment contract as “a contract, transaction, or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party.”66 This definition, now known as the Howey test, can
be broken into four distinct elements: (1) investment of money, (2)
a common enterprise, (3) expectation of profits, and (4) efforts
of others.
1. Investment of money
The first element of the Howey test is whether there was an
investment of money. Although the original test specifically used
the term “money,” subsequent court decisions have determined
that other contributions of value besides cash can satisfy this prong
of the test. For example, investments of services, labor, or property
can be qualifying investments.67 Courts have also found that
investments of bitcoin count as investments of money.68 This first
element is often the least disputed element of the Howey test.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 296.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 299.
65. Id. at 298.
66. Id. at 298–99.
67. See, e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[S]everal
courts have held that an agreement exchanging services for stock constitutes a ‘sale’ under
the Securities Exchange Act . . . .”).
68. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013); see also
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Bitcoin clearly qualifies
as money . . . .”).
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2. A common enterprise
The second factor in the Howey test is whether there is a
common enterprise into which money is invested. The Supreme
Court has not offered its opinion on how a common enterprise
should be defined, but the circuit courts have adopted three main
theories: horizontal commonality, broad vertical commonality, and
narrow vertical commonality.69
Horizontal commonality focuses on the relationships between
the investors, and it is usually found in an enterprise that pools all
of the investors’ contributions.70 In these enterprises, investors
proportionally share all profits and losses,71 and the fortune of each
investor is tied to the enterprise’s overall success.72 Horizontal
commonality considers whether the value of the investors’
investments rise and fall together.
Vertical commonality focuses on the relationships between
investors and the promoter, and it may be found even when one
investor’s fortune is entirely independent from the fortune of
another.73 Vertical commonality comes in two variations: broad and
narrow. Broad vertical commonality is found when an investor’s
gains or losses depend on the efficacy of the promoter.74 If the
investor makes money when the promoter makes good choices or
loses money when the promoter makes poor choices, courts will
find broad vertical commonality.
Narrow vertical commonality is found when the investor’s
gains or losses depend on the fortune of the promoter.75 If the
investor makes money when the promoter makes money or loses
money when the promoter loses money, courts will find narrow
vertical commonality.

69. James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 59, 71–76 (2011); Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–63 (1995).
70. SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Horizontal
commonality is characterized by ‘a pooling of investors’ contributions and distribution of
profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among investors.’”).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
73. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
74. See, e.g., SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (11th Cir. 1999).
75. See, e.g., Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1340–41
(9th Cir. 1994).
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The circuit courts are all over the map when it comes to
deciding which theory to apply. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits look for horizontal commonality, while the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits require broad vertical commonality.76 The other
circuits have either accepted one theory without ruling on the
others, accepted multiple theories, or rejected the traditional
theories for a more wholistic approach.77
3. Expectation of profits
The third factor in the Howey test is whether there was an
expectation of profits by the person who invested money in a
common enterprise. Examples of “profits” include earnings that
result from the use of the investment78 and appreciation in value
that results from the development of the investment.79 The Supreme
Court has noted that these two examples are not the only types of
profits that can qualify an investment as a security.80
Even if an investor’s purchase will generate a profit, there needs
to be an expectation of that profit in order to satisfy this prong of the
Howey test. For example, when investors bought apartments and
received stock in a cooperative housing community that
subsequently appreciated, the purchase of the housing was not a
security because “investors were attracted solely by the prospect of
acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their
investments.”81 But if the investors had bought the apartments
along with a contract for management, housekeeping, or
development of those condos, then the investments might have
been securities.82

76. James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 59, 68 (2011).
77. Id. at 68–69.
78. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338–39 (1967) (finding an expectation
of profits where promoter gave dividends based on the promoter’s profits).
79. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351–53 (1943) (finding an
expectation of profits where promoter of lease agreed to drill exploratory oil wells on
the land).
80. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004).
81. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
82. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1460–62 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (finding
that the purchase of a Hawaiian condominium could be a security because the buyer
depended on others’ management of the condo).
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A motivation to use the item purchased does not preclude the
finding that the investment included an expectation of profits. In
some cases, the motivation to use the item may coexist with an
expectation of profits. For example, a court found that partnership
programs allowing for annual vacations at a resort were securities
because the promotional materials also stressed the economic
benefits of the programs.83 Despite testimony of some purchasers
that their primary motivation was to stay at the resort, the court
determined that other purchasers were likely induced by the
profitable investment opportunity.84
This Supreme Court has described this as a difference of
investment versus consumption.85 If the purpose of the purchase is
to make money, then it is an investment that satisfies the
expectation-of-profits prong of the Howey test. If the purpose of the
purchase is simply to consume or use the product purchased, then
it is not a security.86
4. Efforts of others
The fourth and final factor of the Howey test is whether the
expectation of profits derives from the efforts of others. The original
wording of the test required the profits to come “solely” from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, but circuit courts
subsequently dropped the strict requirement because it was too
inflexible and allowed well-crafted schemes to circumvent
securities law by having the investors perform some nominal
work.87 Realistically, many investment schemes that should plainly
qualify as securities involve at least some efforts by the investors
themselves, including investments that were featured in cases that
the Howey court originally cited.88

83. Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 987–89 (4th Cir. 1994).
84. Id.
85. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 689 (1985) (“Applying the Howey
test, we concluded that the instruments likewise were not ‘securities’ by virtue of being
‘investment contracts’ because the economic realities of the transaction showed that the
purchasers had parted with their money not for the purpose of reaping profits from
the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for
personal consumption.”).
86. United Housing Found., 421 U.S. at 853.
87. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479–83 (5th Cir. 1974).
88. Id.
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This interpretation leaves open the question of how much effort
by others satisfies this prong of the Howey test. Courts have
approached this question from two different viewpoints.
Some courts primarily analyze the promoter’s role, asking
whether the efforts of the promoter (or other third parties) are
“undeniably significant” or are “essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”89 If so, those efforts
will satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test.
Some other courts focus on the role of the investors themselves.
If the investors exert very little control over the whole enterprise
into which they are investing their money, or if they have no
practical way of affecting its success or failure, then their
investment is likely a security. On the other hand, if the investors
have significant duties or perform significant work that affects the
success of the enterprise, then the courts will not find their
investments to be securities.90
In addition to examining who made the efforts, some courts
place emphasis on when the efforts were made. In a case involving
the sale of existing life insurance policies, the D.C. Circuit held that
the instruments were not investment contracts because the value of
the promoter’s efforts were incorporated into the purchase price
and because no one was expected to make further efforts to increase
their value.91 A majority of courts, however, still place some
weight on pre-purchase efforts, because “investment schemes may
often involve a combination of both pre- and post-purchase
managerial activities.”92
B. The Risk Capital Test
The SEC and the federal courts use the Howey test to determine
whether an instrument is an investment contract, but that is not the
only test that is used. An alternative test is the risk capital test.
This test was first articulated by the California Supreme Court93 and

89. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482–83 (9th Cir. 1973).
90. Steinhardt Grp., Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 152–55 (3d Cir. 1997).
91. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
92. SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743–44 (11th Cir. 2005). See also The
Cardozo Blockchain Project, Not so Fast – Risks Related to the Use of a “SAFT” for Token Sales,
LARC (Nov. 21, 2017), https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/blockchain-project-reports/1/.
93. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
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has since been adopted by several other states via judicial action or
legislation.94
Instead of considering whether an investor depends on others
to make profits, the risk capital test focuses on whether the investor
depends on others to not lose the investment. Like the Howey test,
the risk capital test can be stated in a four-part test:95 (1) the investor
provides initial value to the enterprise, (2) the initial value is subject
to the risks of the enterprise, (3) the initial value is induced by
representations that the investor will realize additional substantial
benefit, and (4) the investor does not exercise practical and
managerial control over the enterprise.
There are a few differences between the risk capital test and the
Howey test. First, the risk capital test contains no requirement of a
“common enterprise,” so a nonpooled investment can be a security
even if there is no vertical commonality between the investor and
the promoter.96 Second, the risk capital test looks for a broader
material benefit instead of an expectation of profits, meaning
investments that provide significant financial benefits along with
consumptive uses can be securities.97
Federal courts should primarily use the Supreme Court’s
definition of investment contracts, which makes the Howey test
most likely to govern questions about the SEC’s jurisdiction and the
reach of its regulations. But it is important to remember that
organizations selling securities to raise capital also have to comply
with blue sky laws, or securities laws specific to the state of the
purchasers. Thus, if an instrument is a non-security under the
Howey test but a security under the risk capital test, it could still
violate the laws of states that apply the risk capital test.
The Howey test and the risk capital test, both of which determine
what counts as a security, have each been around for several
decades. But in recent years, judges and SEC officials have had the

94. E.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971); State ex rel. Healy
v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.005 (2011).
95. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr, Inc., 485 P.2d at 109. See also Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities
of a “Security”: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 377 (1967).
96. See, e.g., King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 322–23 (Tenn. 2002) (finding that an
instrument can be a security under the risk capital test even if there is no common enterprise).
97. E.g., Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908–09 (finding that the use of a country
club was a material benefit for which investors risked their capital).
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difficult task of applying these tests to the brand-new financial
instrument of digital assets.
IV. TOKENS DURING AN ICO: ARE THEY SECURITIES?
When Jay Clayton, Chairman of the SEC, was called to speak
before Congress in February 2018, he succinctly captured the
prevailing view on whether tokens released in ICOs are securities:
“I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a security . . . .”98 In a sense, it is
unsurprising that the federal government has determined that
ICOs are securities offerings, since even the name, Initial Coin
Offering, is fashioned after the prototypical securities offering,
Initial Public Offering. Although the specifics of each offering will
differ, it is unlikely that a digital asset sold before its corresponding
network becomes functional will escape securities regulations.99
A. Application of the Howey Test
The legal analysis for classifying an ICO as a security is a
straightforward application of the Howey test. First, because
investors are giving dollars, bitcoin, and other valuable currencies
to the developers in exchange for their promised tokens, ICOs
present a clear investment of money.
Second, ICOs involve a common enterprise regardless of which
version of commonality is preferred. Horizontal commonality is
found because developers pool the investments, and the value of
each investor’s tokens rises and falls together. There is broad
vertical commonality, because an investor’s promised tokens have
zero worth until developers effectively create a functioning
network, as well as narrow vertical commonality because the value
of an investor’s tokens will mirror the value of the developers’
tokens that they have kept for themselves—meaning that the
investors’ and the developers’ fortunes are tied together. While a
company theoretically could give away all of its tokens at an ICO
98. Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security’, COINDESK
(Feb. 6, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-iveseen-security.
99. For a very narrow example of a how a digital asset might be presold without
implicating securities law, see Julie E. Krosnicki, Can a Future Network’s Token Be “Presold”
and Not Qualify as an Investment Contract?, COIN CENTER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://
coincenter.org/entry/can-a-future-network-s-token-be-presold-and-not-qualify-as-aninvestment-contract.
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and not have its own fortunes tied to the fortune of its tokenholders,
companies almost always reserve a significant portion of tokens as
a way to compensate their employees, reserve capital for future
improvements, or slowly release tokens into the market as a way of
supporting the token’s value.
Third, there is an expectation of profits. Because no functioning
product is established at the time of an ICO, consumptive use of the
token is not possible. Investors at this point of the operation buy the
tokens because they believe the token will increase in value after a
functioning product is complete. Even purchasers who truly want
to spend the tokens or participate in the network are induced to
invest early through discounts or other unique benefits. Without an
expectation of a special profit, users would simply wait until the
platform was functional before buying tokens.
Fourth, any profits clearly come from the efforts of others.
During an ICO, the tokens that investors receive for their money
are worth nothing because no actual product exists yet. Any profits
will necessarily come from the efforts of the developers who create
the product. The efforts of those developers are both significant and
essential to the success of the blockchain network. Furthermore, the
investors will not be writing the code and will not be able to
exercise any control over the final success of the network.
B. Decisions by the SEC and the Courts
Both the SEC and multiple federal courts have endorsed this
analysis. In 2017, the SEC published its report on a blockchain
network called “The DAO,” where it asserted that most ICOs are
securities offerings.100 Not long after, the SEC issued a cease-anddesist letter to a company called Munchee, a blockchain network
for restaurant reviews.101 Munchee intended to develop a project
where users could rate restaurants and receive tokens for their
reviews, which could then be redeemed at participating
restaurants. After Munchee raised a significant amount of money
at its ICO, the SEC stepped in and warned Munchee that it had
conducted an illegal, unregistered securities offering.102

100. Report of Investigation, supra note 12.
101. SEC, Munchee Inc., supra note 12.
102. Id.; see also Matthew J. Higgins, supra note 30, at 222–28.
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Courts have also supported the idea that ICOs are security
offerings. Although there have not been many cases to date in the
short history of ICOs, the Eastern District of New York addressed
the issue in the context of a criminal charge for a fraudulent ICO.103
In the court’s analysis, the ICO satisfied all four prongs of the Howey
test and was therefore a security.104
Backed by that administrative and judicial guidance, the SEC
has begun to crack down on unregistered ICOs. In November 2018,
the Enforcement Section of the SEC identified unregistered
offerings by blockchain companies as one of its largest priorities,
stating that it had opened a large number of cases against
companies that had conducted ICOs since the SEC’s first report on
the subject.105 Later that month, the SEC revealed its first official
enforcement actions against ICOs, such as the settlement with
Airfox discussed in Part I.106
According to its initial enforcement actions, the SEC has
implied that blockchain companies whose ICOs are found to be
securities will be subject to the reporting requirements until the
current law permits the companies to stop.107 This makes sense for
traditional firms, who typically grow larger and more influential as
their securities increase in quantity and value. However,
blockchain programs are based on a different business model.
Blockchain developers try to eliminate large centralized
organizations, not become one. And the utility tokens that they
issue are also different from typical securities, in that they can be
used for purposes other than just staking a claim to future cash
flows. As a result, proponents of blockchain technologies have
raised another important question: Even if a utility token issued
during an ICO starts out as a security, can that same token ever
eventually become a non-security?
103. United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *11–23
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018).
104. Id. Contra SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 WL 6181408
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018). In the preliminary holding of this securities fraud case, a different
judge found that the SEC had not proven that tokens sold during an ICO were securities.
Based on the defendant’s assertion that the thirty-two investors were acquaintances and
were merely “testers” of the token, the SEC could not prove, at summary judgement
proceedings, that there was an expectation of profits. Id. at *15–22.
105. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T ANNUAL REPORT, 7–8, 15–16 (2018).
106. Airfox Order, supra note 9.
107. Id. at 9; Paragon, supra note 11.
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V. TOKENS AFTER AN ICO: CAN A SECURITY
BECOME A NON-SECURITY?
It makes sense that a token was a security when it was issued in
an ICO, long before there was any working blockchain network.
But once the network is developed and working, a number of legal
and policy-based arguments support that continued securities
regulation might be inapplicable, unnecessary, and detrimental.
These arguments suggest a token can transform from a security into
a non-security once it crosses a certain line.
There are at least two theories for how this line should be
drawn. The first is based on functionality: digital assets on a
blockchain network that is sufficiently functional should not be
securities. The second is based on decentralization: digital assets on
a blockchain network that is sufficiently decentralized should not
be securities. This Part considers the legal and policy-based
arguments for how and why these lines should be drawn.
A. Drawing a Line Based on Functionality
The functionality theory is based on the idea that, even though
the tokens purchased from promoters before they actually develop
the blockchain network might qualify as securities, the tokens that
are purchased after the network has gone live would not pass the
Howey test and thus should not be considered securities. This
theory applies to utility tokens, or tokens that users buy primarily
for consumption instead of speculation.
This approach is embodied in the Simple Agreement for Tokens
(SAFT) framework that was proposed in 2017.108 The SAFT
agreement provides for blockchain developers to hold legally
compliant ICOs by selling tokens as securities to accredited
investors (thus qualifying for a Regulation D exemption to
registration) prior to developing the network. Once the network is
functional, both the company and the initial investors would be
able to sell their tokens to network users as non-securities. The SEC

108. Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale
Framework, PROTOCOL LABS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-ProjectWhitepaper.pdf.
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has been reluctant to give the SAFT its blessing, preferring to
consider all tokens on a case-by-case basis.109
1. Expectation of profits and functionality
Functional tokens might not satisfy the Howey test’s
“expectation of profits” requirement. Unlike pre-functionality
purchasers who buy tokens at a discount with hopes that they will
gain value, post-functionality purchasers buy tokens because they
want to redeem the tokens for some service or gain access to some
rights associated with the tokens.110 This is more analogous to the
purchase of housing units: although they might appreciate, the
purchasers expect to use them, not profit from them.
But the ability to use tokens does not automatically mean that
there is no expectation of profits. There are two types of people who
purchase tokens: those that want to participate in the network, and
those that want to make money off the token’s anticipated
appreciation.111 As was the case with partnership programs that
provided stays at a vacation resort, the presence of speculative
investors may be enough to find an expectation of profits.112 Even
in Howey, the sale of services contracts along with the land
constituted a securities offering, even though some people bought
the land without the services contract.113
Additionally, it is likely that users who buy the tokens
predominantly for participation rights or consumptive uses will
also have hopes of profiting from their investments. That
secondary expectation of profits would still qualify the utility token
as a security.114
The argument that the expectation of profits is replaced with a
motivation of consumption means that the functional theory can
only apply to utility tokens. Security tokens that give the holder a
109. Hinman, supra note 16 (commenting, in speech’s footnote 15, that the SAFT cannot
be considered in the abstract and that legal analysis must follow the particular facts of
an offering).
110. Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 54; see also Batiz-Benet et al.., supra note 108,
at 9–10.
111. Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 108, at 1.
112. See supra Part IV.A.3.
113. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946).
114. Laura Gritz, Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks: Why the Howey Test Is Still the SEC’s
Best Friend When Examining Initial Coin Offerings, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 193,
205–06 (2018).
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right to share in the network’s profits, on the other hand, are much
more likely to present an expectation of profits.115 Because tokens
can be very versatile, a token that has functions typical of a utility
token could also have rewards typical of a security token.116
2. Efforts of others and functionality
Functional tokens might not satisfy the Howey test’s “efforts of
others” requirement, either. Even if some investors buy the token
solely for capital appreciation, securities regulators would need to
show that that expectation of profits comes from the efforts
of others. But the developers’ efforts may not be “undeniably
significant” nor “essential” once the blockchain network
is functional.
The post-functionality efforts of developers may not be
sufficiently significant to bring about profits because appreciation
of a token’s value is a result of external factors and not the
developers’ efforts.117 Once the network is functional, developers
have completed the lion’s share of the work. While they may make
some additional improvements or tweaks to the network, those
small efforts will not affect the value of the tokens nearly as much
as supply and demand, government action, public sentiment, and
other events over which neither the investor nor the promoter
has any control.118 Because the external factors predominate
the fluctuations in the token’s value, the developers’ efforts are
not significant.119
In a similar vein, post-functionality efforts of developers may
not be essential to the success of the enterprise. A functioning
blockchain network using utility tokens facilitates direct
transactions between participants of the network, without the
developers’ intervention. Although the developers’ efforts were
essential in creating the network, they are not necessary for others
to use the network.
115. Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 44.
116. Over a quarter of all tokens offer a right to profits. Saman Adhami et al., Why do
Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis of Initial Coin Offerings, SSRN , at 3 (Jan. 6, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046209.
117. Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 54–55.
118. Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 108, at 9–10.
119. It may be the users, rather than the developers, who are contributing to the
application’s increasing value by their participation. Crosser, supra note 25, at 414–15.
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In reality, however, it may be too simplistic to say that all of the
developers’ significant and essential efforts took place before the
network was functional. It can be difficult to define exactly when
the network is considered “functional.” The developers may
release a beta version to some testers, followed by a full version to
the public.120 Even after the public version, the developers will
continue maintaining or improving the system. These postfunctionality efforts might simply include tweaking the user
interface or changing maximum transaction limits, but the network
might also require large updates. Developers might patch a security
vulnerability, change the underlying method for verifying
transactions, or advertise the application to a new market of
potential users. These common occurrences could count as
significant efforts.
Additionally, the presence of external factors does not make the
developers’ efforts “undeniably significant,” even if those external
factors powerfully affect the value of the token. While those factors
might influence the value of a digital token, they also substantially
affect the value of any security. The value of a corporation’s stock
might depend much more on whether the market is crashing than
if the board fails to cut certain costs, but those stocks are still
securities. Similarly, the Howey test focuses on the efforts of the
promoters regardless of what other factors affect the success of
the enterprise.
The post-functional efforts of developers might also be
considered “essential” in the sense that a capitalistic economy
requires that developers make continued improvements. All
businesses need to adapt their goods and services to their
consumers’ needs and preferences, including blockchain projects.
If one project does not do so, a similar project might sweep in to
address users’ unmet needs, drawing away those users in the
process.121 The desertion of an unmaintained blockchain project
would significantly harm the value of its tokens. Therefore, even a

120. Cardozo Blockchain Project, supra note 92, at 8–9.
121. There is already considerable competition between blockchain projects that are
trying to serve (or supplant) the same industry. For example, at least seven different tokens
are already being used to create decentralized prediction markets. Steve Walters, 7 Best
Crypto Prediction Markets: Betting on the Blockchain, COIN BUREAU (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.coinbureau.com/blockchain/crypto-prediction-markets/.
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developer’s seemingly minor efforts might be “essential” to survive
in a competitive marketplace.
Lastly, some courts downplay the distinction between prefunctionality efforts and post-functionality efforts.122 Token holders
rely on the blockchain application for their tokens to have any
value, and that blockchain application would not exist without the
past efforts of the developers. Although some courts might
consider those past efforts irrelevant to the Howey analysis because
they are baked into the purchase price of the tokens,123 most courts
have declined to draw a line between pre-functionality efforts and
post-functionality efforts.124 The latter courts might even analyze a
developer’s efforts that occurred during the ICO. The primary
focus is on the nature and significance of the developer’s
managerial efforts, not the timing.
B. Drawing a Line Based on Decentralization
Another line for determining when a token has crossed from a
security to a non-security is the line of decentralization. This theory
applies to blockchain projects where the original developers are no
longer playing the sole or primary role in the maintenance of the
application. Often, these decentralized projects are older and
more established.
A prime example of a project that grew decentralized is
Ethereum. In 2013, the Ethereum Foundation held a pre-sale (the
precursor to the ICO) to raise money to create a blockchain network
which would support smart (or self-executing) contracts.125
Although the Ethereum Foundation created the initial functioning
network, the network is now maintained by dozens of different,
unaffiliated developers.126 These “core developers” hold regular
meetings to discuss potential improvements and changes, and they
make their contributions to the network’s code just as they would
to any other open-source software project. When Director Hinman
122. Cardozo Blockchain Project, supra note 92, at 8–9.
123. E.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
124. See supra Section IV.A.4.
125. Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/.
126. E.g., Ethereum, Project Management: Meeting Notes and Agenda Times, GITHUB,
https://github.com/ethereum/pm (listing the contributors to the Ethereum codebase and
their meetings) (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
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gave his June 2018 speech on digital assets, he suggested that ether
was too decentralized to be a security.127
A main idea behind the decentralization theory is that a
decentralized blockchain project does not have a sole organization
that profits off the project or exerts all the managerial efforts.
Applying securities law would add little value, since there is no
central entity that could make all of the SEC’s required
disclosures.128 Accordingly, a decentralized blockchain project
might not satisfy all the elements of the Howey test.
1. A common enterprise and decentralization
A decentralized blockchain project is less likely to be a
“common enterprise.” For courts that look for horizontal
commonality, there must be a pooling of funds. Although pooling
is evident during the initial fundraising, it is harder to prove once
the tokens have been distributed across the network. When a user
purchases a token, his or her money could be going to any other
user (or speculator) on the network. Because the funds are spread
out between so many different, unaffiliated parties, there might not
be any real pooling of those funds.129
Similarly, there might not be any vertical commonality in a
decentralized blockchain network because there is no single entity
to which the users’ fortunes are tied.130 The value of the tokens on a
decentralized network may depend more on the network’s other
participants than on the network’s developers.131 Even if developers
are still making changes to the application, those developers might
be completely different from the ones who created the system in the
first place. Additionally, they might be a large, unaffiliated group
of programmers who make individual contributions to the code.
Their contributions might be more or less helpful, and they might
have more or less personal stake in the blockchain. It is difficult to
say that the fortunes of all users are tied to the efficacy or fortunes
of a disjointed group of people.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Neither would there be vertical commonality between users
and the blockchain network’s validators. Although users depend
on validators to keep the blockchain current and accurate, the
validators are not making decisions that affect the success of the
enterprise; they are simply running the predetermined code that
adds new transactions to the blockchain. Additionally, validators’
fortunes may not be correlated to the users’ fortunes. Because they
get compensated for simply verifying transactions, regardless of
whether the token value is trending upward or downward, they
could potentially make money even as users lose money.132
Despite the possibility that a blockchain may become so
decentralized that it no longer forms a common enterprise, it is
unlikely that many blockchain projects reach that point. It may be
a long time before the original developers cede control of a project
or invite other programmers to contribute to their project. In the
meantime, there is a distinct affiliated group of developers and the
worth of the users’ tokens are tied to the developers’ decisions.
Additionally, the original developers usually keep a percentage of
the tokens for themselves,133 further tying their fortunes to the
users’ fortunes. Even for a more decentralized project that has new
programmers contributing to its codebase, there may still be a clear
group of “core developers” who are making decisions about the
project and have a clear stake in its success. Continued reporting
requirements from these core developers would still benefit
potential investors.
Even the network’s validators may not be so decentralized as to
escape the definition of “a common enterprise.” While some
consensus methods, such as proof-of-work, use competition to keep
miners separate and unaffiliated, other methods are more
conducive to finding centralization.134 In proof-of-stake validation,
the people with the greatest stake in the network are the ones most
likely to control and verify transactions (and receive an even larger

132. See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 51.
133. It is common for developers to keep approximately 15% of all issued tokens for
themselves. See, e.g., DR. SANJEEV VERMA ET. AL., MUNCHEE TOKEN: A DECENTRALIZED
BLOCKCHAIN BASED FOOD REVIEW/RATING SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM 18 (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theventurealley.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/MuncheeWhite-Paper.pdf.
134. Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 57–58.
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stake for doing so).135 This leads to a cycle of increasing influence.
It is possible that a group of the largest stakeholders could band
together to decide which transactions get verified and when.136 This
same centralization exists in a permissioned consensus system,
where certain entities (such as the developers themselves) manage
and verify all of the network’s transactions. These scenarios are not
so decentralized that they make securities regulations inapplicable.
It is also important to remember that commonality is required
by the Howey test but not the risk capital test.137 Therefore, even if a
federal court uses the Howey test to find that a digital asset lacks
commonality and is not a security, a state court might subsequently
determine that the very same digital asset is a security under the
risk capital test.
2. Efforts of others and decentralization
A decentralized blockchain may also not satisfy the Howey test’s
requirement that any expected profits come from the “efforts of
others.” A network may be so decentralized that there is no
coherent group of people exerting “significant” or “essential”
managerial efforts.
Users rely on the efforts of validators to keep the blockchain
functioning. As discussed in the context of commonality, there is an
argument that the validators for decentralized blockchains are so
diverse and unaffiliated that a user cannot be said to rely upon the
efforts of any particular verifier to receive the expected profits.138
This can be true for well-established, popular blockchains, such as
Bitcoin or Ethereum, but many blockchains use methods of block
validation that are far more likely to create a coherent group that
exerts essential efforts. Either way, however, the act of verifying
transactions may not be “managerial.” Validators are typically just
running premade code and not making any decisions.
The real decision-makers are the developers of the blockchain.
The developers write the code to make small or large changes to the
way the blockchain network functions. As discussed previously,
135. Jake Frankenfield, Proof of Stake (PoS), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 11, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proof-stake-pos.asp.
136. Mohit Mamoria, Is Proof of Stake Really the Solution?, HACKER NOON, (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://hackernoon.com/is-proof-of-stake-really-the-solution-2db68487f4ba.
137. See supra Section IV.B.
138. See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 16.

1142

005.MAUGHAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1113

7/17/20 12:43 PM

Utility Token Offerings

these efforts might be “significant” and “essential.” However, the
decentralized line-drawing theory posits that there is no third party
to which securities law could be helpfully applied and that
securities law is unnecessary because of the decentralized
network’s transparency.139
Even if the current developers of a blockchain project are not
the same as its original developers, there is still a limited, exclusive
group of programmers running the system. Although any
programmer can suggest changes to the code, only the core
developers can make changes to the codebase. The core developers
hold frequent meetings to discuss and debate the proposed
changes.140 Just because these developers do not work for the same
employer does not mean that they are unaffiliated or disjointed.
They are the ones capable of making final decisions and exerting
efforts that significantly affect the success of the whole project.
The transparency of a blockchain system does not necessarily
affect the analysis of a token under the Howey test. Even if users can
inspect the open-source code on GitHub and watch the core
developers’ meetings on YouTube (and even if they are capable of
understanding the code and technical jargon), users are still relying
on the efforts of those core developers. Looking at the blockchain
project from the users’ perspective, they have no ability to affect its
success. Users can suggest changes to the network, but they cannot
make those changes nor exert any real control over the success of
the network. Users are relying on the efforts of the core developers
to keep their tokens functioning and appreciating.
CONCLUSION
In an increasingly digital world, blockchain technology
presents the opportunity to make enormous improvements to the
economy. The ability to conduct global transactions without
requiring independent verification by a third party may completely
transform e-commerce and other industries. The enthusiasm for the
technology also brings uncertainty, as society grapples with how to
unroll blockchain projects in a secure, moral, efficient, and effective
manner. Those same concerns apply to how entrepreneurs raise the
funds necessary to make their blockchain projects a reality.
139. Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 58.
140. See Ethereum, supra note 126.
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Securities regulators want investors to make informed, rational,
and deliberate decisions before providing capital to blockchain
projects. Entrepreneurs want investors to contribute large amounts
of capital and to reap the benefits of being an early adopter of their
blockchain project. Even if entrepreneurs concede that their ICOs
are security offerings, they assert that perpetually regulating digital
assets as securities would be unnecessary, unproductive, and
overly burdensome.
The debate over whether post-distribution digital tokens
should always be securities has primarily consisted of using
functionality or decentralization to draw lines between securities
and non-securities: A token is no longer a security if it is
sufficiently functional, or a token is no longer a security if it is
sufficiently decentralized.
This line-drawing presents two problems for blockchain
advocates. First, the lines are blurry. It is hard to say how functional
or how decentralized a blockchain project needs to be before
crossing the line to become a non-security. Second, the lines are
farther to the side of non-securities than many advocates would
prefer; that is, the current securities laws make it very difficult for
a blockchain project to cross the line from a security to a nonsecurity. While it may be possible, a vast majority of blockchain
projects will never graduate to become non-securities.
Full-fledged securities regulations would impose hefty burdens
on blockchain developers and on token holders. As a result,
developers would be forced to avoid conducting ICOs, foreclosing
an effective way of raising funds that fittingly coincides with the
unique purposes and principles of blockchain technologies. On the
other hand, schemes that trigger securities law do so for a reason:
there is usually a potential for investors to make poor, uninformed
decisions that might have been avoided.
These competing interests require a balance between
technological innovation and investor protection. The question of
whether digital tokens are securities is often discussed as a blackand-white dichotomy, but that misses the point of a balance. A
balance instead seeks for a gray area or a middle ground.
The government is capable of striking a balance. The SEC has
already carved out more lenient requirements for emerging growth
companies, small businesses, and even crowdfunding. The SEC can
also create a similar exception for digital assets. The formulation of
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this special rule should consider the unique characteristics of digital
assets, such as transparency of blockchain networks and the
functional aspects of their associated tokens, when deciding what
information developers can feasibly disclose and what information
would be most helpful for potential investors. Although a detailed
proposal of the ideal regulation is beyond the scope of this
particular Note, a discussion about how to better regulate
blockchain applications is already underway.141
Applying a decades-old legal standard to a new technological
innovation is not an easy task. Creative lawyers and judges are
usually capable of squeezing a new subject matter into old laws,
but that is not likely to achieve the optimal result. When it comes to
blockchain networks and their associated digital assets, a
thoughtfully crafted regulation would benefit developers,
regulators, users, and investors.
Scott W. Maughan*

141. For one proposal of a disclosure scheme for blockchain developers, see Tiffany L.
Minks, Comment, Ethereum and the SEC: Why Most Distributed Autonomous Organizations Are
Subject to the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and a Proposal for New
Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 430–37 (2018).
* J.D. candidate, April 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. Thank you to my wife, Dana, for helping me put these ideas on paper.
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